M3: Dynamic Games
Many real strategic situations unfold over time: moves are sequential, history matters, and future incentives shape present behavior. Extensive-form games and repeated-game models capture this structure. The folk theorem shows how cooperation emerges from repeated interaction—the same dynamic that LLM multi-agent systems exhibit when agents learn to coordinate without central oversight. The trigger strategies here foreshadow the monitoring and oversight mechanisms developed in M8.
Module preview
Many real strategic situations unfold over time: moves are sequential, history matters, and future incentives shape present behavior. Extensive-form games and repeated-game models capture this structure. The folk theorem shows how cooperation emerges from repeated interaction—the same dynamic that LLM multi-agent systems exhibit when agents learn to coordinate without central oversight. The trigger strategies here foreshadow the monitoring and oversight mechanisms developed in M8.
Lectures and materials
L7: Extensive-Form Games
Sequential decisions, histories, and strategic commitments.
L8: Repeated Games
Folk theorems, cooperation, and trigger strategies.
🔜 Fall slides forthcoming